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Abstract
I build a general equilibrium model to show that deposits are a special form of
financing, that makes banks more suitable to extend long-term loans when confronted
with the risks of monetary policy. In the model, banks borrow short-term and lend
long-term, are subject to a minimum equity requirement consistent with Basel III,
and face a financial friction: they cannot raise equity on the market. Consistent with
the ”bank-capital channel” of monetary policy, when the risk-free rate increases, the
value of the banks’ assets and equity are eroded, and banks deleverage by cutting
their lending. I show that, thanks to a combination of banks’ market power in the
deposit market and of the money-like properties of deposits, the profits on deposits are
strongly countercyclical, and reduce the contraction of lending at high interest rates
due to the bank capital channel. Amid current proposals for narrow banking, this
effect provides a rationale for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking activities
in current commercial banks.
∗I thank Philippe Bacchetta, Kenza Benhima, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Dirk Niepelt, Jean-Charles Rochet,
Andreas Tischbirek, participants in the 2019 SSES annual conference in Geneva and in the 2019 Econometric
Society European Meeting in Manchester for useful comments.
1 Introduction
Since the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, amid discussions about how to reform
the banking system, narrow banking proposals have received renewed interest. In a
nutshell, what the different versions of narrow banking proposals have in common is
the idea that the two main functions of current banks, deposit-taking and lending
activities, should be separated in two different institutions. While the discussion has
focused on the advantages of such proposals in terms of financial stability, in particular
to avoid bank runs (see for example Cochrane (2004)), little has been said about the
possible disadvantages.
What, if any, are the synergies between the deposit function and the lending func-
tion? This question is also important in the discussion about the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy. While there is a literature about the ”lending channel” of
monetary policy (see Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1994)),
positing that, by affecting the supply of reserves and hence of deposits, monetary pol-
icy shifts the supply of loans, the more recent literature has internalized the Romer
and Romer (2000) critique, which argues that if banks can switch without frictions to
non-reservable forms of funding, deposit supply should not affect loan supply.
In this paper I argue instead that deposits are a special form of funding for banks
that engage in maturity transformation: deposits do affect the supply of loans, as they
provide banks with a natural hedge against the interest rate risk of monetary policy.
I rely on the empirical results of Drechsel, Savov and Schnabl (2017), henceforth DSS.
They show empirically that the spread between the Fed Fund rate and the deposit rate
is increasing in the Fed Fund rate: for a percentage point increase in the Fed Fund
rate, the interest rate on “core deposits” (defined as checking + saving + small time
deposits) increases on average by only 40 bps, while at the same time deposit demand
decreases by around 3%. While DSS focus on the fact that deposit demand decreases
when the policy rate increases, which in their view amplifies the contraction in lending
at high interest rates, I read the data from a different viewpoint and argue that profits
on deposits are the important quantity. Profits on deposits, the product of the deposit
spread and the quantity of deposits, strongly increase after a policy rate increase.
For a bank that borrows short-term and lends long-term, an interest rate increase
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results in an erosion of equity. To the extent that banks face a friction in raising new
equity on the market1, and that they are subject to an equity constraint (for economic
or regulatory reasons), an erosion of bank equity leads to a contraction in bank lending.
This is the basis of the “bank-capital channel” of monetary policy, see van den Heuvel
(2003), henceforth vdH. The objective of my model is to show that profits on deposits,
which increase after a policy rate increase, significantly mitigate the contraction in
bank lending due to the bank-capital channel.
A confirmation of this mechanism comes from a recent paper by Carletti, De Marco,
Ioannidou and Sette (2019). The authors exploit a tax reform in Italy that induced
households and businesses to substitute bonds with bank deposits. Their main result
is that banks that, as a result of the reform, experienced a larger increase in deposits,
significantly increased the maturity of term loans, while not changing the overall credit
supply. Thus, their findings support the idea that an increase in the quantity of deposits
makes banks more willing to engage in maturity transformation.
In my model, banks borrow in the form of deposits and bonds. Each bank is a
monopolist in the deposit market of its county, and pays an interest on deposits that is
below the policy rate. Households can allocate the savings among three assets: cash,
deposits and and an asset – bonds – paying the policy rate. Cash (paying 0 interest)
and deposits are ”money-like” assets, as they reduce a transaction cost of consumption,
as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), and, as in DSS, are imperfect substitutes. I
show that this setup results in deposit spreads increasing in the policy rate. Intuitively,
since cash, which is the main competitor of deposits as a money-like asset, always pays
0 interest, interest on deposits does not meed to increase one-for-one with the policy
rate.
Deposit demand decreases in the policy rate for two reasons. First, as the deposit
spread decreases at higher policy rates, households choose to allocate more of their
savings to the asset paying the policy rate. Second, as the policy rate increases, as a
general equilibrium effect household consumption decreases, which in turn decreases
the demand for money-like assets. Despite the lower deposit demand, however, profits
on deposits are strongly increasing in the policy rate. Calibrating the model so that
1Banks’ shareholders might also be unwilling to raise equity on the market, as this could disproportionally
benefit bondholders. See Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2018).
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both deposit spreads and deposit demand respond to a change in the policy rate in
line with observed data, I obtain that profits on deposits almost triple when the policy
rate goes from 2% to 6%.
On the asset side of the balance sheet, banks hold long-maturity loans to firms
in a ”Bank-dependent” (BD) sector. Banks are in monopolistic competition in the
loan market. As in vdH, banks are risk-neutral and their objective is to maximize
the present discounted value of future dividends, subject to an equity requirement
constraint consistent with the Basel III Accord requirement. The financial friction in
the model is that banks cannot raise equity on the market. They can retain profits, but
this is expensive as accounting profits, i.e. operating income minus interest payments
and write-offs on loans, are taxed at a constant tax rate τ .
A contractionary monetary policy shock, affecting the long-duration asset side of
banks more than the short-duration liability side, can erode the bank’s equity and result
in a violation of the equity constraint or in an increase of the probability of a future
violation, thus affecting the bank’s willingness to extend new loans. My objective is
to quantify by how much the profits on deposits, which increase after a contractionary
monetary shock, can mitigate the “bank capital channel”, i.e. the contraction in bank
lending at high policy rates due to balance sheet effects.
I make two alternative, extreme assumptions regarding the fixed cost of managing
deposits. The first assumption (”zero cost”) is that this cost is zero. The second
assumption (”high cost”) is that this cost is such that the average profit on deposits
is equal to zero over time. My results indicate that deposits significantly mitigate the
balance sheet effects on credit supply at high policy rates, and that this holds even in
the ”high cost” case, thanks to the fact that profits on deposits are high when banks
need them most.
The impact of the financial friction is very significant at high interest rates: when
the interest rate is 1% above the natural rate, if a bank does not issue deposits new
lending is on average 9.5% lower than in the model without the financial friction. With
deposits, the contraction in new lending is 7% in the ”high cost” case, and only 5% in
the ”zero cost” case.
When the interest rate is 2% above the natutal rate, without deposits new lending
is on average 24.5% lower than in the model without financial friction. With deposits,
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in the “high cost” case the contraction in new lending is 18%, and in the “zero cost”
case it is only 13%.
In sum, deposits mitigate the contraction in new lending by a factor roughly between
25% and 50% when the policy rate is at least 1% above the natural rate, depending on
the assumption about their managing cost.
An evaluation of the impact of bank credit supply on output is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, based on the estimates by Cappiello, Kadareja, Kok and
Protopapa (2010), credit supply has a significant impact on output in the euro area2.
Combining my results on credit supply with their estimates, I find that a narrow
banking reform, by preventing banks that extend loans from issuing deposits, might
reduce output in the euro area by up to 40 bps when the policy rate is 1% above the
natural rate and by up to 1% when the policy rate is 2% above the natural rate.
To sum up, the contribution of this paper is threefold: first, I identify a new mech-
anism by which deposits affect banks’ loan extension and the transmission of monetary
policy. Second, I quantify the impact of deposits by embedding this mechanism in
a bank model inspired by the partial equilibrium model of vdH. Third, I embed the
bank model in general equilibrium, which allows me to take into account the effect of
changes in the macroeconomic environment, in particular changes in aggregate con-
sumption and inflation, on the bank’s lending problem.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of bank lending in the transmission
of monetary policy, often called “the credit channel” of monetary policy.
A vast part of this literature (see, for example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke
and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)) focuses on the so-called
“broad credit channel”, or“financial accelerator”: an interest rate increase causes a
deterioration of borrower firms’ balance sheet, which in turn causes an increase in the
external finance premium and a decrease in loan demand over and above the decrease
due purely to the risk-free interest rate increase.
Another part of the literature (see, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1988),
2This result is obtained using the same methodology as Driscoll (2004), who instead finds insignificant
impact of credit supply on output in the US.
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Kashyap and Stein (1994)) focuses on the ”narrow credit channel”, or ”lending chan-
nel”: a decrease in central bank reserves forces banks to issue fewer reservable deposits.
Assuming that deposits are the main source of funding for bank loans, lower deposit
issuance would result in lower loan issuance. As previously discussed, this line of
reasoning has been criticized by Romer and Romer (2000).
Other branches of the literature find links between monetary policy and bank loan
supply through different channels: for example the previously mentioned ”bank capi-
tal channel” (van den Heuvel (2003), Adrian and Shin (2010a)) and the “risk-taking
channel” (Borio and Zhu (2012) and Adrian and Shin (2010b)), according to which
monetary policy may influence banks’ perception of risk or attitude toward risk.
This paper is closer to the ”lending channel” literature in that it focuses on the
role of deposits and on the effect of monetary policy on loan supply, and to the ”bank
capital channel” literature, in that it argues that deposits have an impact on this
specific channel.
In contrast to the lending channel literature, however, this paper argues that de-
posits have a mitigating, rather than amplifying, effect on loan supply, the main dif-
ference being that instead of focusing on the quantity of deposits, that decreases after
an interest rate increase, I focus on deposit profits, that increase after an interest rate
increase.
Some recent papers emphasizing that an increase an interest rate has a positive
effect on banks’ interest rate margins and hence banks’ profits on new business are
Brunnermeier and Koby (2018), Di Tella and Kurlat (2017) and Wang, Whited, Wu
and Xiao (2018). The setup in Wang, Whited, Wu and Xiao (2018) is the most similar
to this paper. One of their results, that partly overlaps with the results in this paper,
is that banks’ market power interacts with the friction banks face due to capital re-
quirements. In particular they find that there is a “reversal interest rate”, below which
reduced bank profits make a further rate cut contractionary.
2 Model Overview
The agents in the model and the credit flow in the economy are shown in Figure 1.
The central agents in the model are in the top row of the figure. In addition to banks,
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the other important agents are households, that generate deposit demand, and firms in
the “Bank-Dependent (BD) sector” (which need to borrow from banks), that generate
loan demand. The agents in the bottom row, the government and firms in the “New
Keynesian (NK) sector”, allow the embedding of the model in General Equilibrium:
the government sets the policy rate, the central stochastic quantity in the economy,
following a Taylor rule; firms in the NK sector generate the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC).
Figure 1
households
Deposits
Loans
Bank
BD sector
NK sector
Bonds
Government
Section 3 of the paper focuses on households and banks in their deposit-taking function.
These are the agents that determine deposit demand and supply. As described in the
Introduction, households allocate their savings among three assets: cash, deposits and
an asset paying the policy rate. Cash and deposits, despite paying low interest, are
held by the household for the money-like properties.
Section 4 of the paper focuses on the bank’s problem in its loan-extending function,
with the objective of investigating how the bank’s lending decisions are affected by the
profits on deposits. In the Appendix I describe in detail the two firm sectors, that
correspond to two alternative technologies for the production of the unique consump-
tion/investment good. In particular, the “NK sector”, similar to firms in the basic
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New-Keynesian model in Gali (2008), is useful to generate the NKPC.
One comment is in order on the interaction between the NK sector, the banks and
the BD sector in my model. Embedding the bank problem, which is highly non-linear,
in the general equilibrium NK model is a non-trivial challenge. To make the prob-
lem simpler, I assume that both the household disutility of labor and the production
function in the NK sector are linear in labor. I show that this implies that the Eu-
ler equation, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve and the Taylor rule form a system of
three equations in three variables, consumption, inflation and the policy interest rate,
independent of banks (except for the choice of the deposit rate) and of production in
the BD sector. The intuition for why this happens is that, with linear labor disutil-
ity and linear production function in the New-Keynesian sector, households would be
able to adjust their labor supply and thus production in the New-Keynesian sector to
compensate for fluctuations in the production of the bank-dependent sector. Although
with these assumption the model would be unsuitable to evaluate the impact of the
banking sector on the macroeconomy, it is calibrated to generate a realistic response
of consumption and inflation to monetary shocks, very similar to that of the basic NK
model in Gali (2008), and is thus suitable to analyze the effect of the macroeconomic
environment on the bank’s problem, which is the focus of this paper.
3 The Economics of Deposits
3.1 Empirical Evidence
DSS present detailed empirical evidence on the relationship between deposit quantities
and the Fed fund rate, and between deposit spreads and the Fed Fund rate. They
estimate that an increase of 100 bps in the Fed Fund rate leads on average to a 61 bps
increase in the deposit spread. The increase in the spread is shown to be clearly cor-
related to banks market power: within the same bank, branches in high-concentration
areas increase their spread by less than branches in low-concentration areas.
They also estimate the semi-elasticity of deposits with respect to the deposit spread
to be -5.3. Thus, an increase of 100 bps in the Fed Fund rate, which is estimated to
raise the deposit spread by 61 bps, would induce a decrease in the quantity of deposits
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of around 320 bps.
A clear implication, which is not drawn by DSS, is that profits on deposits increase
after a Fed fund increase. For example, an increase of the Fed Fund rate from 4%
to 5% represents a 25% increase in the Fed Fund rate rate, which also translates in a
25% increase in the deposit spread if the relationship between the latter and the Fed
Fund rate is approximately linear. Despite the 3% decrease in the quantity of deposits,
profits on deposits (equal to the product of deposit spread and deposit quantity) would
increase by over 20%. Only for extremely high values of the Fed Fund rate (over 30%!)
the decrease in the deposit quantity would be more important than the increase in the
spread.
3.2 Model: Households and Deposit Demand
Households consume, work and save in three different nominal assets: an asset At
(government or bank bonds), bank deposits Dt or cash Mt. Each of the three saving
instruments pays a different interest rate: cash pays zero interest, deposits pay an
interest idt and the asset A pays the policy rate it. The policy rate follows a stochastic
process and is set by the government, as we will see later. Households maximize
U = Σ∞t=0β
tE0[u(ct, ht)] (1)
where ct is consumption and ht hours worked. The intra-period utility function is
separable in consumption and labor
u(c, h) =
c1−σ
1− σ − F (h) (2)
3 subject to the budget constraint
Wtht + (1 + it−1)At−1 + (1 + i
d
t−1)Dt−1 +Mt−1 + PtΠt
= Ptct(1 + χt(xt)) +Dt +At +Mt (3)
where Wt is the (nominal) wage, Πt are real profits from firms and banks and Pt is the
price level of the consumption good. Households face a proportional transaction cost
3In order to embed the model in General Equilibrium in a simple way, I use a linear disutility of labor
F (h) ∝ h. This will be explained in detail in Appendix B1. It has no impact on the demand for deposits,
that is the focus of this section.
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of consumption χt, which depends on the ratio xt between nominal consumption and
liquidity lt, a bundle of cash Mt and bank deposits Dt:
xt ≡ Ptct
lt
(4)
lt ≡
(
δM
ǫ−1
ǫ
t +D
ǫ−1
ǫ
t
) ǫ
ǫ−1
(5)
xt can be interpreted as “liquidity velocity”,
As in DSS, δ measures the liquidity of cash relative to deposits and ǫ is the elasticity
of substitution between cash and deposits. Appendix A1 contains all the first-order
conditions of the household problem.
3.2.1 The choice among the three assets
From the Euler equations with respect to cash and deposits, I obtain that the ratio
between cash and deposit holdings is a function of the deposit spread relative to the
policy rate,
it−idt
it
, and is independent of the transaction cost χ(x)
Mt
Dt
=
(
δ
it − idt
it
)ǫ
(6)
This also implies that liquidity can be written as
lt = fDt (7)
with
f ≡
(
1 + δ
(
δ
it − idt
it
)ǫ−1) ǫǫ−1
(8)
From the Euler equation with respect to deposits and with respect to the risk-free asset
we can obtain the equation
f
1
ǫ x2tχ
′(xt) =
it − idt
1 + it
(9)
which allows us to find the demand for liquidity lt =
Ptct
xt
and the demand for deposits
Dt = f
−1lt as a function of it and i
d
t , for a given level of nominal consumption Ptct.
The meaning of (9) is simple: for a given level of consumption, liquidity holdings are
chosen so that the marginal benefits in terms of reduction of the transaction cost (LHS)
equate the marginal cost, in terms of forgone interest (RHS).
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I now specialize the transaction cost to the form used by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004)
χ(x) = ax+
b
x
− 2
√
ab (10)
This function has a minimum for x =
√
b
a
, which represents the satiation level of
liquidity.4 Inserting (10) in (9) I obtain
x =
√
f−
1
ǫ (it − idt ) + b(1 + it)
a(1 + it)
(11)
from which it is easy to obtain the deposit demand
Dt =
Ptct
f
√
a(1 + it)
f−
1
ǫ (it − idt ) + b(1 + it)
(12)
3.3 Deposit Rate Determination
At time t a monopolist bank issues issues deposits Dt and sets the deposit rate i
d
t . The
deposit demand as a function of the deposit rate is (12). The objective of the bank is
to maximize the profits it will realize next period, which are, in real terms
Πt+1 = (ii − idt )
Dt
Pt+1
(13)
taking the policy rate it, consumption ct and inflation
Pt+1
Pt
as given. The demand for
deposit Dt is given by (12). Appendix A2 shows the first-order condition for i
d
t . There
I also show that for it << b the optimal spread is
it − idt =
(
1
(ǫ− 1)δǫ
) 1
ǫ−1
it (14)
whereas for it >> b
it − idt =
(
1
2(ǫ− 1)δǫ
) 1
ǫ−1
it (15)
showing that the deposit spread is indeed increasing in the policy rate.
4Taken literally, this transaction cost increases for liquidity holdings bigger than the satiation level. This
has no consequence because liquidity holdings bigger than satiation level will never be chosen.
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3.4 Consumption and Inflation Determination
A full description of the economics of deposits, including the quantity of deposits and
the banks’ profits on deposit as a function of the policy rate, requires knowledge of
aggregate consumption, affecting the demand for deposits and hence the banks’ profits
on deposits, and inflation, also affecting the profits on deposits.
The full model including government and firms results in a system of three equa-
tions: the Euler equation, the Taylor rule, which describes how the government sets
the policy rate, and the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), obtained from firms
in the “NK sector”, plus an equation describing the stochastic process followed by a
“monetary shock”. The solution of this system gives consumption ct, the policy rate
it and inflation πt as a function of the shock vt, or, equivalently, consumption and
inflation as a function of the policy rate it. Details about firms in the NK sector and
about the derivation of the NKPC are given in Appendix B1.
Using the velocity equation (11) and the deposit rate id = id(it), obtained as a
function of the policy rate as the solution of (55), the Euler equation (52) can be
written in log-linear form around the steady state
cˆt = Et[cˆt+1]− 1
σ
((1 + p)(it − rn)− Et[πt+1]) + p
σ
Et[it+1 − rn] (16)
rn ≡ β−1−1 is the steady state value of the policy rate, cˆ ≡ ct−cSScSS (cSS is steady-state
consumption) and
p ≡ 2ax
′
(1 + 2ax¯−√ab) (17)
where x¯ is the value of velocity (11) at it = rn and x¯′ is the derivative of velocity with
respect to it at it = rn.
The policy rate it is set according to the Taylor rule
it = rn + φππt + φcct + vt (18)
The monetary shock vt follows an auto-regressive process
vt+1 = ρvvt + ǫ
v
t+1 (19)
Finally, the NKPC is
πt = βEt[πt+1] + Λcˆt (20)
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The slope of the Phillips curve Λ, as seen in Appendix B1, is related to parameters of
the NK firms, in particular to the degree of price stickiness faced by these firms.
The system (16), (18), (19) and (20) implies that the inflation rate and consumption
(in log-deviation from steady state) are proportional to the policy rate it (in deviation
from the steady state value rn):
cˆt = bc(it − rn)
πt = bπ(it − rn)
where
bc = − 1 + p(1− ρv)
σ(1− ρv)− ρv Λ1−βρv
bπ = − 1 + p(1− ρv)
σ(1− ρv)1−βρvΛ − ρv
3.5 Economics of Deposits: Calibration and Results
The parameters that are relevant for the economics of deposits are shown in Table
1. On the left-hand side of the table we find the parameters related to household
preferences and money demand. The parameters a and b appearing in the transaction
cost have been calibrated to the US economy by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004),
using quarterly data from 1960 to 20005 . The elasticity of substitution between cash
and deposits, ǫL, and the liquidity of cash relative to deposits δ are such that for a
one percent increase in the policy rate, the increase in the deposit rate ranges from 35
bps (when the policy rate is close to zero) to 55 bps (when the policy rate is high).
On the right-hand side of the table we find the parameters of the Taylor rule and the
New-Keynesian Phillips curve. These are close to the parameters in Gali (1983). The
slope of the NKPC, as we see in (68) and (69), is essentially related to the parameter
α of the production function of NK firms, that I take equal to 0 for reasons explained
in Appendix B1, and the price stickiness Calvo parameter θ, that I take equal to 0.75,
implying that prices are reset once per year. With these parameters, 1% increase in the
5To transform the parameters a and b estimated by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), which are appropri-
ate when annual consumption is used, into the corresponding parameters that are appropriate when using
quarterly consumption, I multiply their value of a by 4 and divide their value of b by 4.
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policy rate results in a decrease in consumption of 0.68% and a decrease in inflation of
0.87%, close to the behavior of these variables in the basic NK model of Gali (1983).
Table 1 Calibration: Economics of Deposits
Household & Money Demand Parameters Taylor rule and NKPC parameters
Parameter Description Parameter Description
β = 0.99 discount rate ρv=0.6 persistence of monetary policy shock
σ = 1.5 elasticity of intertemporal substitution φc=0.5/4 Taylor rule parameter
δ = 1.05 liquidity of cash relative to deposits φπ = 1.5 Taylor rule parameter
ǫL = 3 elast. of subst. cash/deposits Λ = 0.086 slope of the NKPC
a = 0.0111× 4 transaction cost parameter
b = 0.07524/4 transaction cost parameter
The three panels of Figure 1 show the main results related to deposits. The panel
on the left shows that the deposit spread, i−id, grows from 127 bps when i = 2% to 365
bps when i = 6%. The spread grows approximately linearly in this range, by about
60 bps for every 1% increase in the policy rate, in line with the empirical findings
by DSS. The center panel shows that the quantity of deposits is decreasing in the
policy rate. For a 1% increase in the policy rate, the quantity of deposits decreases by
2.86% in this range. It decreases through two channels: first, since the deposit spread
increases, households prefer to allocate more of their savings to the asset A, and they
lower their holdings of deposits as a fraction of consumption (see the dashed line in the
center panel). Second, household consumption decreases after a contractionary shock,
so households need to hold less deposits. The solid line in the center panel shows that
the quantity of deposits as a fraction of steady state consumption decreases even more.
All in all, however, when i = 6% the quantity of deposits is only 11% smaller than
when i = 2%, while the spread increases by almost a factor 3. The right panel shows
that profits on deposits at i = 6% are higher than at i = 2% by a factor 2.6.
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Figure 1: Deposits
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Bank profits on deposits
4 The Banks’ Problem
In this section I outline the decision problem of the bank. There is a continuum of
banks of measure 1, each of which borrows in the form of deposits and bonds and
extends loans. The key friction is that banks cannot raise equity on the market, they
can only build equity by retaining profits. Moreover, banks need to satisfy a minimum
equity requirement, as described below.
Some elements of the structure of the bank’s problem, notably the financial friction
and the equity requirement, are similar to vdH. The objective of vdH was to evaluate
the impact of the friction by comparing the lending behavior of the firm facing the
friction to the behavior of the “unconstrained bank”, i.e. the bank that can raise equity
on the market or that holds enough equity that the constraint does not currently bind
and will never bind in the future. In contrast, the main purpose of this paper is to
evaluate the impact of deposits on the lending behavior of the constrained bank. I will
compare the lending behavior of the constrained bank that optimally chooses deposits
to that of the constrained bank that borrows fully in bonds, against the benchmark of
the unconstrained bank. The latter is able to exploit all profitable opportunities and
its lending is not affected by deposits.
I assume that each bank is a monopolist in the deposit market, and is in monopolis-
tic competition with other banks in the loan market. We can imagine for example that
each bank operates in a county, and regulation (or high transportation costs) prevent
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households in one county from holding deposits in another county. Firms however are
allowed to take loans from banks outside their county. A bank’s balance sheet is
Assets Liabilities
PtLt Dt
Bt
PtEt
The following subsections describe in detail the components of the balance sheet.
4.1 Loans
Loans are long-term, risky real assets. A loan granted at time t is a security bought by
bank i at price P it , that by contract demands a real payment (δ¯+ ρ¯)(1− δ¯)n−1 from the
borrower to the bank at each time t+n, n = 1, ...,∞. In other words, every period the
borrower is required to repay a fraction δ¯ of the outstanding principal, and a constant
real interest rate ρ¯. The contractual loan duration is therefore 1
δ¯
.
However, loans carry default risk: a (stochastic) fraction ωt of the outstanding loans
defaults at each time t. Hence, a loan granted at time t results in the following actual
payments
(δ¯ + ρ¯)(1− ωt+1) at t+ 1
(δ¯ + ρ¯)(1− ωt+2)(1− δ¯ − ωt+1) at t+ 2
.....
(δ¯ + ρ¯)(1− ωt+n)(1− δ¯ − ωt+n−1)...(1− δ¯ − ωt+2)(1− δ − ωt+1) at t+ n
(21)
I take the default shocks ω to be i.i.d. and independent of the other shock in the
economy, the monetary shock. One loan granted at time t is an identical security, at
t+1, to (1− δ¯−ωt+1) loans granted at t+1. I call Lt the outstanding loans at time t (a
state variable), and Nt the number of new loans granted at time t (a decision variable).
Loans evolve according to
Lt+1 = (1− δ¯ − ωt+1)(Lt +Nt) (22)
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Loan demand comes from firms in the BD sector. These firms view loans from dif-
ferent banks are imperfect substitutes, which implies that banks are in monopolistic
competition in the loan market. This imperfect substitutability might be due to bank
specialization in the financing and monitoring of different activities, or to geographical
specialization. Paravisini, Rappoport and Schnabl (2017) provide empirical evidence
of such specialization.
The production function of firms in the BD sector, described in detail in Appendix
B3, generates the loan demand curve
N it = (ζν)
1
1−ν (ρ¯+ δ¯)−
1
1−ν
(P it)ǫB−1 (PMt ) 11−ν−ǫB (23)
Here P it is the loan price obtained by bank i at time t, ζ and ν are parameters of the
BD firms production function, ǫB > 0 is the elasticity of substitution of loans from
different banks, and PMt is the “market loan price” at time t (details in Appendix B2).
The most important element in (23) is the fact that the demand for loans of bank i
is upward sloping in the loan price paid by the same bank, or, equivalently, the loan
price P it(N it ) paid by bank i at time t is a decreasing function of the number of new
loans N it issued by the bank.
Appendix B2 shows that an equivalent formulation is possible, in term of “unit
loans”: one unit loan granted at time t involves one unit of good transferred from the
bank to the borrowing firm at t, and demands a real payment (δ¯+ ρ(t))(1− δ¯)n−1 from
the borrower at each subsequent time t+ n (the loan rate ρ(t) is decided at time t but
is constant over the life of the loan).
4.2 Liabilities: Deposits and Bonds
Deposits Dt are one-period securities issued at time t, yielding an interest i
d
t chosen
by the bank at time t. The downward sloping demand curve (taking households con-
sumption as given) is given by (12).
Bonds Bt are one-period securities yielding the policy rate it, set by the government.
6
6I assume that the bank ends its activity when Et < 0, and the bonds are guaranteed by the government.
This guarantees that the bank can borrow at the risk-free rate.
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4.3 Equity
At the beginning of period t, before the bank makes new loan, deposit, and dividend
decisions, the bank’s equity is equal to the value of the outstanding loans, plus the
cashflows coming from assets and liabilities
Et = V
L
t Lt + CFt (24)
All terms in (24) are in real terms. I take the value of a loan, used by the regulator to
compute the accounting vaue of the bank’s equity, to be equal to the highest price that
a bank would be willing to pay for an identical loan, i.e. the price that an unconstrained
bank would pay:
V Lt =
δ¯ + ρ¯
δ¯ + ρUt
(25)
Although in this model there is no secondary market for loans, (25) is in the spirit of
“mark-to-market accounting”, which is the current accounting standard.7 The uncon-
strained loan rate ρUt is obtained by solving the problem of an unconstrained bank. As
we will see, ρUt is an (increasing) function depending only on the policy rate it. V
L
t is
therefore a decreasing function of it.
Cashflows CFt include cashflows from assets at time t, i.e. coupons and principal
repayments, the repayment of liabilities, taxes Tt and fixed costs cF < 0
CFt = (δ¯+ ρ¯)(1−ωt)(Lt−1+Nt−1)− (1+ it−1)Bt−1
Pt
− (1+ idt−1)
Dt−1
Pt
+ cF − Tt
Pt
(26)
where Bt−1 and Dt−1 are the bonds and deposits issued at time t− 1, due at t. Taxes
Tt are a fraction τ of the taxable base TBt, given by the interest received on the loans,
net of the interest paid on liabilities and the fixed costs:
Tt = τ×TBt = τ×[Pt(ρ¯(1−ωt)(Lt−1+Nt−1)+cF−ωt(Lt−1+Nt−1))−it−1Bt−1−idt−1Dt−1]
(27)
The bank then makes a decision about the dividends Divt to distribute in period t,
the new loans Nt to purchase at price Pt(Nt) and the liabilities Bt and Dt. In order
7The Financial Accounting Standard 157 (FAS157) introduced by the Financial Accounting Standard
Board (FASB) in 2006, established that assets should be valued in agreement with their “exit price”, replacing
the previously used ”historical-cost” accounting.
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to honor the previous-period liabilities and carry out the decision about Divt and Nt,
Bt and Dt need to satisfy
Dt +Bt = Pt(Divt + Pt(Nt)Nt − CFt)
= Pt(Divt + Pt(Nt)Nt − Et + V Lt Lt) (28)
(where the last equality uses (24), so that at the end of the period the bank’s equity,
equal to the value of the assets minus the liabilities, can be written as
E′t = V
L
t (Lt +Nt)−Bt −Dt = Et −Divt + (V Lt − Pt(Nt))Nt (29)
Interestingly, (29) shows that reducing Nt is a way to immediately rebuild equity: since
Pt(Nt) is upward sloping, by reducing the supply of new loans the bank can purchase
the new loans at a price which is lower than their accounting value V Lt .
4.4 Equity Requirement
I model the equity requirement following vdH. All loans are assumed to be in the
highest risk category. At the beginning of a period t, a bank is free to issue new loans
and pay dividends only if the value of its equity exceeds the regulatory minimum.
Moreover, if new loans are issued and/or dividends are paid, the end-of period value of
equity must still be equal to or above the regulatory minimum. Thus, the requirement
can be expressed in two statements
• If, at the beginning of period t, Et < γV Lt Lt, then it must be Nt = Divt = 0.
• Otherwise, Nt andDivt must be such that at the end of the period E′t ≥ γV Lt (Lt+
Nt).
4.5 Bank’s objective
The bank is a risk-neutral entity whose value function is given by the present discounted
value of future dividends. It can be written in recursive form
Vt(Et, Lt, it) = max{Nt,Divt,Dt}Divt +
1
1 + it
Et[Vt+1(Et+1, Lt+1, it+1)] (30)
subject to
• The laws of motion of loans (22);
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• The law of motion of equity
Et+1 = V
L
t+1(it+1)(1− δ − ωt+1)(Lt +Nt) + CFt+1 (31)
with
CFt+1 = (δ¯ + (1− τ)ρ¯)(1− ωt+1)(Lt +Nt)− (1 + (1− τ)it)Bt +Dt
Pt+1
+ (1− τ)(it − idt )
Dt
Pt+1
+ (1− τ)cF + τωt+1(Lt +Nt) (32)
As shown in (28) the sum Bt+Dt can be written in terms of the decision variables
Divt and Nt. Hence time-t + 1-equity depends on time-t state variables, time-t
decision variables (Divt, Nt and Dt) time-t+ 1 shocks.
• The deposit demand function (12), which also depends on aggregate consumption
ct, an endogenous macroeconomic variable;
• The equity requirement constraint;
• The loan demand function (23).
Notice that the decision about deposits Dt (deposits) only affects the bank through
its contribution to next period’s cashflows (32) and hence equity (31). Since Bt +Dt,
as already pointed out, can be expressed in terms of the decision variables Nt and
Divt, deposits affect the bank’s problem only through the contribution to next period’s
cashflows
(1− τ)(it − idt )
Dt
Pt+1
(33)
This shows that despite the complexity of the bank’s decision problem, the choice about
deposits is a static one, and the deposit rate (and hence deposit quantity) chosen by
the bank are, for each value of the policy rate, those obtained in section 2.
Notice also that, with perfect competition in the lending market, and given banks’
risk neutrality, only unconstrained banks would lend. Constrained banks would have
no incentive to lend, given that they would make no profits in expectation, and that
they would risk violating the equity requirement, with the consequence of not being
able to distribute dividends.
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4.6 The Unconstrained Value Function
The value function and policy functions of the unconstrained bank are the benchmark
against which we can compare the policy functions of the constrained bank. As in vdH,
the value function of the unconstrained bank has the form
V (Et, Lt, it) = a0(it) + Et + aL(it)Lt (34)
which can be verified by inserting (34) in (30), and maximizing with respect to Nt. By
doing this, we can find the functional form of a0(it) and aL(it), and the policy function
N(it), which is only a function of it. Equations for these quantities can be found in
Appendix A3.
Finally, for the unconstrained bank, it is always the case that
Divt = Et − γV Lt (Lt +Nt) + (V Lt − Pt)Nt (35)
so that it is E′t = γV
L
t (Lt + Nt). There is no point in keeping equity in the bank in
excess of the equity requirement. Equity can be raised without frictions next period,
and this is more attractive than keeping profits in the firm due to taxes.
5 Calibration
I take one period to be a quarter and normalize consumption to be 10 each quarter
in steady state, i.e. when the nominal interest rate is equal to the natural rate, taken
to be equal to 4% in annual terms. The parameter values are summarized in Table 2.
The (discrete) shock distributions are summarized in Table 3. I discretize the interest
rate process it: I use the 5 values [2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%]. The transition matrix for the
nominal interest rate is consistent with the solution of the system (16), (18), (20),
namely it is Et[it+1− rn] = ρv(it− rn), and corresponds to a volatility of the monetary
shock ǫv of about 0.57%.
The mean of ω (annualized) is 1.3%, close to the historic US average for commercial,
industrial and consumer loans. The value of the repayment rate δ¯, 25% annualized,
implies a loan maturity of 4 years.
The aggregate productivity in the BD sector ζ, appearing in the loan demand (23),
determines the size of the bank. I calibrate it so that deposits, determined by household
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Table 2: Bank & BD sector parameters
Parameter Description
γ = 0.08 equity requirement
τ = 0.35 corporate tax
ǫB = 6 elast.of substit. bank loans
ν = 0.33 capital share BD sector
δ¯ = 0.25 loan repayment rate
ω = 0.013 loan default rate
ρ¯ = 0.08 stand. loans coupon rate (annual)
ζ = 0.22 aggregate productivity BD sector
chigh−costF = −0.093 fixed cost with deposits (high-cost case)
czero−costF = −0.046 fixed cost without deposits (& in zero-cost case)
demand for liquidity, represent around 70% of the bank’s liabilities, in line with averages
for US banks (for deposits net of reserve requirements). Without deposits the fixed
cost cF is calibrated so that the average ”market-to-book” ratio of the bank’s equity
q ≡ V/E, where V is the bank’s value function, is 1.15, close to an average value for
banks in the US.8 In the model with deposits, I consider two alternative, extreme cases.
In one case (“zero cost”) I assume that managing deposits entails no extra cost. Hence
in this case cF is the same as in the model without deposits. In another case (“high
cost”) I assume that the cost of managing deposits is such that profits on deposits, net
of this cost, are zero on average. In the latter case the advantage for banks of issuing
deposits lies entirely in the countercyclical nature of the associated profits.
6 Results
6.1 The Unconstrained Bank
The numerical value of the value function and policy function NU (where the super-
script emphasizes that it is the policy function for the unconstrained bank) are in Table
4, for the case in which the bank optimally chooses deposits, and in the case in which
8For example https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040815/what-average-pricetobook-ratio-
bank.asp reports that, as January 2015, the average market-to-book ratio for US banks was 1.1.
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Table 3: Shocks
Shock Values (Annualized) Probabilities
ω [−0.0052, 0.0016, 0.0168, 0.04] [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]
Variable Values Transition Matrix
i [0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06]


0.3 0.6 0.1 0 0
0.05 0.5 0.45 0 0
0 0.16 0.68 0.16 0
0 0 0.45 0.5 0.05
0 0 0.1 0.6 0.3


deposits are 0. Analytic formulas for a0 and aL, as well as for the maximization prob-
lem that determines NU , can be found in Appendix A3. Notice that deposits affect the
term a0 of the value function, but not the policy function N
U . The intuition is that
the ability to raise equity on the market allows the bank to undertake all profitable
lending opportunities, regardless of the profits it makes in its deposit activity.
Table 4: Unconstrained Bank
With Deposits i = 2% i = 3% i = 4% i = 5% i = 6%
NU(i) 0.879 0.874 0.869 0.863 0.858
a0(i) -0.0423 -0.0158 0.0093 0.0331 0.0557
aL(i) 0.0342 0.0340 0.0339 0.0338 0.0336
Without Deposits i = 2% i = 3% i = 4% i = 5% i = 6%
a0(i) 0.0102 0.0096 0.0090 0.0084 0.0078
6.2 The Constrained Bank: Moments
The bank’s problem in the constrained case can be solved with value function iteration
methods. As also found by vdH, the value function is highly non-linear, epecially
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when equity is close to the equity requirement value E = γV LL, which implies that
linearization techniques are unsuitable for this problem. I discretize the state variable
L and E, in addition to i as discussed in the calibration section, making the grid denser
in the region of high non-linearity.
The main moments from the simulation of the solved model are shown in Table
5. The left side of the table shows the moments for the problem without deposits (in
which it is simply Dt = 0 for every t). The left side shows the moments for the full
problem with deposits. Deposits represent om average 71% of total bank liabilities.
With deposits, the average number of new loans N and the stock of all outstanding
loans L increase , and their standard deviations decrease. Equity as a fraction of
assets, both at the beginning and at the end of the period, decrease, but their standard
deviations decrease. All autocorrelations decrease, reflecting a higher tendency of the
main variables to mean-revert. However, the effect of deposits seems very modest if we
just look at these moments.
The effect of deposits is however quite sizeable in periods of high interest rates and
when equity is low. Notice that, with the interest rate transition matrix shown in Table
2, which is consistent with a persistence of the monetary policy shock ρv = 0.6, the
two extreme values of interest rate (2% and 6%) occur with a probability of only 1.5%
each, so even if deposits have a big effect on lending for i = 6%, this has low impact
on averages.
Table 5: Simulated Moments
Variable Without Deposits With Dep. + extra cost With Dep., no extra cost
mean std autocorr mean std autocorr mean std autocorr
E (frac of L) 0.095 0.004 0.60 0.094 0.004 0.55 0.092 0.004 0.117
L 11.80 0.70 0.98 11.90 0.52 0.96 12.05 0.24 0.93
N 0.83 0.083 0.62 0.842 0.070 0.51 0.850 0.044 0.118
E’ (frac of L) 0.087 0.0027 0.64 0.087 0.0026 0.57 0.082 0.001 0.25
D 0 0 - 7.88 0.11 0.56 7.88 0.11 0.56
D/(Total Liab) 0 0 - 0.72 0.036 0.94 0.72 0.02 0.78
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Table 6: New Loans by Interest Rate
i Prob. NU N without Dep. N with Dep. + extra cost N with Dep., no extra cost
2% 1.5% 0.879 0.876 0.870 0.873
3% 20% 0.874 0.866 0.863 0.863
4% 57% 0.868 0.841 0.845 0.851
5% 20% 0.863 0.781 0.801 0.826
6% 1.5% 0.858 0.650 0.700 0.742
Figure 2: New Loans
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
it(%)
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
N uncon.
N without Dep
N with Dep + cost
N with Dep, no cost
Table 6 and Figure 2 show average new lending for each interest rate value, comparing
the unconstrained lending NU with the constrained lending with and without deposits,
and, in the case with deposits, distinguishing between the case with zero cost of man-
aging deposits and the case with cost equal to the average profit on deposits. We see
that, lending above 4% and especially at 6% is dramatically affected by the friction on
equity. At 5%, if deposits are 0 new lending is about 9.5% lower than in the uncon-
strained case, and with deposits the reduction in new loans is only around 4.3% (in
the case with no deposit cost) and 7.2% (with deposit cost). At 6%, if deposits are 0
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new lending is about 24.5% lower than in the unconstrained case, and with deposits
the reduction in new loans is 13.5% (with zero deposit cost) and 18.4% (with deposit
cost). In sum, if the bank holds deposits, the reduction in lending at high interest
rates is mitigated by a factor roughly between 25% and 50% depending on the cost of
managing deposits.
Discussion
The results obtained in this section imply that, for the average bank that cannot raise
equity on the market and that now issues deposits, a narrow banking reform would
decrease the issuance of new loans by a percentage between 3% and 5% after a con-
tractionary monetary shock that bring the policy rate 1% above the natural rate (i.e.
to 5% in this model), and between 8% and 13% after a shock that bring the policy rate
2% above the policy rate.
The limitation of this model is that, by construction, a contraction in credit supply,
which mechanically affects capital and production in the BD sector, has no effect on
total output. To have an idea about possible effects of credit supply on output, we
have to look beyond this model.
What does the existing literature tell us about the effect of credit supply on total
output? The evidence very much depends on the country. Driscoll (2004) finds that
for the US the effect of credit supply shocks on output is insignificant. Cappiello,
Kadareja, Kok and Protopapa (2010), using the same metodology as Driscoll (2004),
find that the effect is very significant for countries in the euro area. Specifically, they
estimate that a contraction of 1% in the supply of new loans results in a contraction
of output by 8 bps.
It is possible that not all banks face the same costs of raising equity. While these
costs are probably higher for small and medium banks, the economic intuition of the
“leverage ratchet effect” by Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2018) suggests
that shareholders’ interests might induce bigger banks to resist equity issuances, even
when those would increase the firms’ value.
In the limit case in which all banks cannot or do not want to issue equity, and
based on the estimates by Cappiello, Kadareja, Kok and Protopapa (2010) , my results
on credit supply suggest that a narrow banking reform in the euro area could reduce
output by 24 to 40 bps when the policy rate is 1% above the natural level and by 64
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and 104 bps when the policy rate is 2% above the natural level.
6.3 The Constrained Bank Problem: Impulse Response
Functions at Low Equity
To see the effect of deposits for low equity, I look at impulse-response functions after
a contractionary monetary policy shock, using a value of beginning-of-period equity
before the shock equal to 8.5% of assets. This low value of beginning-of-period equity
occurs about 4% of the time. If the contractionary shock occurs at t = t¯, the impulse-
response function for new lending is defined as
IRFNt¯ = Et¯[Ns|it¯ = i0 + 0.01]− Et¯[Ns|it¯ = i0], for s ≥ t¯ (36)
Notice that the non-linearity of the model implies that the impulse response functions
cannot be calculated by setting all shocks after the initial one to 0, rather they must
be obtained by averaging over all possible future paths.
Figure 3 plots the impulse-response functions (36) for i0 = [2%, 3%, 4%, 5%], in the
model without deposits (solid line), and with deposits in the “high-cost” case (dashed
line). For all values of the initial interest rate we notice how the shock has much
more persistent effects without deposits. Two effects contribute to this. First, in
the case with deposits, the increased profits on deposits after a contractionary shock
immediately contribute to rebuilding equity. Second, in the absence of deposits the
bank has only one way to rebuild equity: deleveraging, i.e. cutting new lending .
However, this means foregoing more profitable lending opportunities, with the effect of
slowing down the rebuilding of equity in later periods.
7 Conclusion
The results in this paper establish that deposits play an important role in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. As theoretically established by vdH, and empirically confirmed
e.g. by Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), capital requirements and
banks’ balance sheet conditions are important determinants of the supply of loans,
especially after contractionary monetary policy shocks.
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Figure 3: IRFs
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My contribution is to show that profits on deposits mitigate the contraction of credit
due to balance sheet effects, and my quantitative exercise finds that this mitigation
effect is very significant and increasing in the distance between the policy rate and the
natural rate.
This result contradicts the commonly held view, inspired by Romer and Romer
(1990), that deposits and any shocks to them do not affect the supply of credit, if the
bank can easily switch to alternative forms of financing.
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Appendix A
A1: Household FOCs and asset allocation choice
FOC with respect to ct
c−σt = λtPt(1 + χ(xt) + xtχ
′(xt))) (37)
which becomes, specialized to the transaction cost (10)
c−σt = λtPt(1 + 2axt − 2
√
ab) (38)
FOC with respect to ht
F ′(ht) = λtWt (39)
FOC with respect to At
λt = βλt+1(1 + it) (40)
FOC with respect to Mt
λt
(
1− x2tχ′(xt)
∂lt
∂Mt
)
= βλt+1 (41)
which becomes, specialized to the transaction cost (10)
λt
(
1− (ax2t − b)
∂lt
∂Mt
)
= βλt+1 (42)
Using the definition of liquidity (5), (41) can be written as
λt
(
1− x2tχ′(xt)δ
(
Mt
lt
)− 1
ǫ
)
= βλt+1 (43)
FOC with respect to Dt
λt
(
1− x2tχ′(xt)
∂lt
∂Dt
)
= βλt+1(1 + i
d
t ) (44)
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which becomes, specialized to the transaction cost (10)
λt
(
1− (ax2t − b)
∂lt
∂Dt
)
= βλt+1(1 + i
d
t ) (45)
Using (5), (44) can be written as
λt
(
1− x2tχ′(xt)
(
Dt
lt
)− 1
ǫ
)
= βλt+1(1 + i
d
t ) (46)
Combining (40), (43) and (46) I get
1
δ
(
Dt
Mt
)− 1
ǫ
=
it − idt
it
≡ st (47)
so
Mt = (stδ)
ǫDt (48)
Hence
lt = Dt(1 + δ(δst)
ǫ−1)
ǫ
ǫ−1 = Dtft (49)
with ft ≡ (1 + δ(δst)ǫ−1)
ǫ
ǫ−1 . Combining (40), (46) and (49) I get
f
1
ǫ x2tχ
′(xt) =
it − idt
1 + it
(50)
which implies, with transaction cost (10),
Dt =
Ptct
ft
√
a(1 + it)
f−
1
ǫ (it − idt ) + b(1 + it)
(51)
Finally, the three Euler equations, with respect to A, D and M , respectively, are
c−σt
Pt(1 + 2axt − 2
√
ab)
= β(1 + it)Et
[
c−σt+1
Pt+1(1 + 2axt+1 − 2
√
ab)
]
(52)
c−σt (1− f
1
ǫ (ax2t − b))
Pt(1 + 2axt − 2
√
ab)
= β(1 + idt )Et
[
c−σt+1
Pt+1(1 + 2axt+1 − 2
√
ab)
]
(53)
and
c−σt (1− δ((δst)1−ǫ + δ)
1
ǫ−1 (ax2t − b))
Pt(1 + 2axt − 2
√
ab)
= βEt
[
c−σt+1
Pt+1(1 + 2axt+1 − 2
√
ab)
]
(54)
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A2: The choice of the deposit rate
The monopolist bank maximizes (13) subject to the deposit demand (12). The first
order condition, written in terms of the relative spread st ≡ it−i
d
t
it
is
(
1− ǫδ
ǫsǫ−1t
1 + δǫsǫ−1t
)
+
it
2((1 + δǫsǫ−1t )
− 1
ǫ−1 stit + b(1 + it))
(
δǫsǫt
(1 + δǫsǫ−1t )
ǫ
ǫ−1
− st
(1 + δǫsǫ−1t )
1
ǫ−1
)
= 0
(55)
This condition implicitly defines st (or i
d
t ) as a function of it. For small it, meaning
it << b we can neglect the second term on the LHS of (55), which can then be written
as (
1− ǫδ
ǫsǫ−1t
1 + δǫsǫ−1t
)
= 0 (56)
Hence, for it << b it is
st =
it − idt
it
=
(
1
(ǫ− 1)δǫ
) 1
ǫ−1
(57)
For high it, meaning it >> b then (55) can be approximated as(
1− ǫδ
ǫsǫ−1t
1 + δǫsǫ−1t
)
+
1
2
(
δǫsǫ−1t
(1 + δǫsǫ−1t )
− 1
)
= 0 (58)
wich implies
st =
it − idt
it
=
(
1
2(ǫ− 1)δǫ
) 1
ǫ−1
(59)
A3: The Unconstrained Value Function
Inserting (34) in (30), and using the law of motion of loans (22), the law of motion of
equity (31) and the choice of dividends of the unconstrained bank (35), I find that the
vector aL (each component of which correspond to a value of i) satisfies
aL = (1−DF ×M)−1
[−γVL + (1− δ¯ − ω¯)DF ×M × VL + (δ¯ + τ ω¯)DFv
+ (1− τ)(1− ω¯)ρ¯DFv − (1− γ)DF × (VL + (1− τ)(VL ∗ i))] (60)
where DF is the square diagonal matrix n × n (if the vector i has n elements) with
the n discount factors 11+i on the diagonal, DFv is an n-component vector equal to the
diagonal of DF , M is the transition matrix for the risk-free rate i (see Table 3), ω¯ is
the average value of the shock ω, VL is the n-component vector of loan values (see (25))
for each value of i. I denote by a ∗ b the element-by element product of two vectors a
and b, so that for example VL ∗ i is the element-by-element product of VL and i.
32
NU is the n-component vector that maximizes
NU ∗ [(1− γ)VL + (1− δ¯ − ω¯)DF ×M × aL + (1− δ¯ − ω¯)DF ×M × VL
−(1− γ)DF × ((1− (1− τ)i) ∗ VL) + ((1− τ)(1− ω¯)ρ¯+ δ¯ + τ ω¯)M × (1 + π)]
−PUNU (61)
where π is the n-component inflation vector and PU is the n-component price vector.
Finally
a0 = (1−DF ×M)−1[τDF × (VL ∗ i ∗NU )− PU ∗NU
+ (1− δ¯ − ω¯)(DF ×M × aL) ∗NU +DF × ((1− τ)(i− id) ∗D
+ δ¯ ∗NU + (1− ω¯)ρ¯NU + (1− τ)cF + τ ω¯NU )] (62)
Notice that a0 is the only quantity which depends on deposits D.
Appendix B: The Macroeconomic Environment
There are two firm sectors in the economy, corresponding to two technologies for the
production of the consumption good. One sector, the NK sector, is typical of a standard
New-Keynesian model and generates the NKPC. Notice that NK firms use only labor
as factor of production and do not need to borrow (either from households or from
banks). The other sector, the BD sector is comprised of firms working on long-term
projects, that need to borrow from banks. BD firms therefore generate loan demand.
B1: The NK sector
As in the basic NK model (e.g. Gali(2008)), there are intermediate good producers and
final good producers. Intermediate good producers are a continuum of firms indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm i produces a different variety of intermediate good, using only
labor as input, according to the production function
Yt(i) = aNt(i)
1−α (63)
where a is a represents the (constant) level of technology and Nt is labor at time t. I
take α = 0. This choice, together with the choice of linear labor disutility results in
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a New-Keynesian Phillips curve that is independent of the banking sector, as shown
below.
Each firm produces a differentiated good and is a price setter for that good. How-
ever, following Calvo (1983), each firm is able to reset its price only with probability
1 − θ in any given period. This each period a fraction θ of firms keeps their price
unchanged.
Final good producers are perfectly competitive firms taking the different varieties
of intermediate product as input. The production function for the final good is
Y NKt =
(∫
di y
ǫG−1
ǫG
iy
) ǫG
ǫG−1
(64)
where the superscript indicates that this is the final production of the NK sector and
ǫG is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of intermediate goods.
The final good producer’s problem is
maxYt, yj,t, i∈[0,1]PtYt −
∫ 1
0
di pityit (65)
where yjt is the demanded quantity of the intermediate good j. From the first-order
conditions, the demand for the intermediate good of variety i is
yit =
(
pjt
Pt
)−ǫG
Yt (66)
Moreover, from the zero-profit condition, the price for the final good is given by Pt =(∫ 1
0 p
1−ǫG
it di
) 1
1−ǫG
As in Gali (2008), the fraction 1− θ of intermediate-good producers who can reset
their price at time t need to solve the intertemporal problem of choosing the price
that maximizes the present value of profits from the current period to the next period
they will be able to reset their price, discounted with the household discount factor
Qt,t+k = β
kλt+k/λt. Gali (2008) shows that this problem leads to the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve, which in its log-linear form reads
πt = βEt[πt+1] + Λmˆct (67)
where mˆc is the log-deviation of the marginal cost from steady state, and
Λ =
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
Θ (68)
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Θ =
1− α
1− α+ αǫG (69)
Again, Gali (2008) shows that marginal cost can be written as
mct = σct + (φ+ α)nt − log(a)− log(1− α) (70)
Notice that, if both φ and α are equal to 0, i.e. if both the production function and
the disutility of labor are linear in labor, marginal cost (70) is independent of labor.
Since I assume constant productivity a, I have
mˆc = σcˆ (71)
and the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is
πt = βEt[πt+1] + Λcˆt (72)
where cˆ is the log-deviation of consumption from steady state.
B2: Unit Loans
A unit loan Kt, granted by a bank to a firm at time t, starts with the transfer of one
unit of good from the bank to the firm at time t. A loan rate ρt is also established
at time t. A unit loan demands a payment (δ¯ + ρ(t))(1 − δ¯)n−1 at each time t + n,
n = 1, ...,∞. In reality, a fraction ωt+n defaults et each time t+ n, resulting in actual
payments
(δ¯ + ρ(t))(1− ωt+1) at t+ 1
(δ¯ + ρ(t))(1− ωt+2)(1− δ¯ − ωt+1) at t+ 2
(δ¯ + ρ(t))(1− ωt+3)(1− δ¯ − ωt+2)(1− δ¯ − ωt+1) at t+ 3
.....
(δ¯ + ρ(t))(1− ωt+n)(1− δ¯ − ωt+n−1)...(1− δ¯ − ωt+2)(1− δ − ωt+1) at t+ n
(73)
where the shocks ω are i.i.d and independent of the monetary shock. Notice that the
cashflows (73) are proportional to the cashflow (21) of standard loans defined in Section
4, with proportionality factor δ¯+ρ
(t)
δ¯+ρ¯
. Hence one unit loan issued at time t at interest
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ρt is equivalent to
δ¯+ρ(t)
δ¯+ρ¯
“standard” loans, as defined in section 4. Since the price of a
unit loan is 1 by construction, the price of a standard loan must then be
Pt = δ¯ + ρ¯
δ¯ + ρ(t)
(74)
The advantage of standard loans as defined in Section 4 is that they have more con-
venient aggregation properties: one loan issued at t becomes equivalent, at t + 1, to
1− ¯delta loans issued at t+1. In contrast, unit loans K issued at time t are equivalent,
at t+ 1, to a number of loans that depends on ρ(t+1) and ρ(t).
B3: The BD sector
Each period a new time-t representative start-up firm installs capital borrowed from
different banks.
Production for the time-t start-up occurs starting at t+ 1, with the only factor of
production being the capital installed at t:
Y
(t)
t+1 = ζK˜
ν
t
Y
(t)
t+2 = ζ(1− δK)νK˜νt
.... ....
Y
(t)
t+s = ζ(1− δK)(s−1)νK˜νt
with K˜t =
(∫ 1
0 di(K
(i)
t )
ǫB−1
ǫB
) ǫB
ǫB−1
, where K
(i)
t are the units of capital loaned by bank
i at t and ǫB is the elasticity of substitution of loans from different banks. δK is the
depreciation rate of capital.
For each unit loan obtainedfrom bank i i at t, the firm owes (1− δ¯)s−1(ρi + δ¯)K(i)
in each subsequent period t+ s. Therefore the firm’s profits at time t+ 1 are
Πt+1 = ζK˜
ν
t −
∫
di(ρi + δ¯)K
(i)
t (75)
and in each subsequent period s
Πt+s = ζ(1− δK)ν(s−1)K˜νt − (1− δ¯)s−1
∫
di(ρi + δ¯)K
(i)
t (76)
Assuming that the firm negotiated the repayment rate δ¯ to the bank so that (1−δK)ν =
(1− δ¯), then each period’s profits are simply scaled down by a factor (1− δ¯) relative to
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those of the previous period. Hence the loan decision that maximizes the first period’s
profits also maximizes the profits of each subsequent period.
The profit-maximizing capital borrowed at t from bank i is
K
(i)
t = (ζν)
ǫB (ρi + δ¯)
−ǫBK˜
1−ǫB(1−ν)
t (77)
After some straightforward algebra I obtain
K˜t = (ζν)
1
1−ν (ρM + δ¯)
− 1
1−ν (78)
with
(ρM + δ¯) =
(∫
di(ρi + δ¯)
1−ǫB
) 1
1−ǫB
(79)
Substituting (78) in (77) I get
K
(i)
t = (ζν)
1
1−ν (ρi + δ¯)
−ǫB (ρM + δ¯)
− 1
1−ν
+ǫB (80)
In terms of standard loans, where bank i makes an initial payment P i = δ¯+ρ¯
δ¯+ρi
to the
firm and the loan rate is a constant ρ¯, (standardized) loan demand is
N i = (ζν)
1
1−ν (ρ¯+ δ¯)−
1
1−ν
(P i)ǫB−1 (PM) 11−ν−ǫB (81)
where the market price PM is related to ρM by PM = δ¯+ρ¯δ¯+ρM .
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